I echo the Chairman’s sentiment. Thank you, Mr.

Secretary, for being here. I think it is, to state the obvious, important

that high-ranking officials are here and reporting directly.

And we appreciate it.

I have an opening statement, which I apologize for not being

here to give. I would ask unanimous consent that it be able to be

placed in the record. And I will withhold it.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this timely and important hearing. Mr.

Secretary, thank you for being here and for your tireless efforts in Sudan. It’s also

a pleasure to have General Jones with us today. In my experience, he is a man who

doesn’t see problems—he looks for solutions.

Last September, Secretary Powell released the findings of a State Department investigation

which found that genocide was occurring in Darfur.

Now, here we are over a year later—and it is not clear to me that any of the fundamentals

have changed for the vast majority of the 3.4 million people affected by

the war in Darfur.

According to a leading Washington based NGO, as many as 400,000 people may

have been killed as a result of the hostilities. Countless women have been raped,

and continue to be the victim of sexual violence. Two million people are still displaced

from their houses. The fragile cease-fire in Darfur seems to have disintegrated in the past month. Banditry has increased exponentially. The headlines coming

out of Sudan over the past couple of weeks read ‘‘Darfur Risks Descending Into

Anarchy,’’ and ‘‘Fresh Fighting in Darfur Threatens Peace Talks.’’ Just this morning,

the BBC reports that U.N. Humanitarian Relief Coordinator Jan Egland is saying

that violence in Darfur is so bad that the humanitarian relief effort could ‘‘all

end tomorrow.’’

I know there has been some movement. The July 5 agreement between Khartoum

and rebels on a Declaration of Principles may provide a framework through which

to handle further peace negotiations. With NATO’s help, the African Union has been

able to deploy nearly 2,000 additional troops to Darfur, for a total of about 5,800.

The death of John Garang did not result, as some feared, in the unraveling of the

North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

But none of this progress has resulted in peace in Darfur. Instead, it seems to

me that the situation in Darfur has changed from one in which clearly identifiable

actors are engaged in straightforward hostilities into one in which there is persistent

violence by people who are difficult to identify.

And I am not convinced we are doing all we can to stop the violence and create

the conditions that allow people to go home. When I was on the Chad-Sudan border

early this summer, an AU commander told me the AU lacks the mandate, the men

and the material to really make a difference. Since then, NATO has stepped in to

help deploy more AU forces. But I still think the AU would benefit from a small

number of NATO troops on the ground to back them up. I believe that if NATO

stood up to back the AU mission, the Janjaweed, the rebels, and the bandits would

stand down.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that during this hearing we come to a mutual

understanding of not only how to measure progress in Darfur, but more important,

how exactly we should define success. What are the minimum conditions that

must exist in Darfur before we can declare the AU mission a success? I want to be

sure that we clarify this issue here today because I for one am very concerned that

we are all beginning to suffer from ‘‘Darfur fatigue.’’

What do I mean by that?

I mean that, with so many problems here at home after Katrina and Rita—not

to mention Iraq—the American people understandably may want us to refocus our

efforts and our resources. And we may have to make some strong arguments to convince

them we cannot make our responsibilities at home and abroad a zero sum

game.

I mean that we are becoming inured to the suffering of nearly two million people

living in camps because the World Health Organization says that their overall

health has improved.

I believe that we may mistakenly believe that current security conditions in

Darfur are acceptable because while the Sudanese government is still sending military

aircraft into Darfur for ‘‘observation,’’ at least they haven’t dropped bombs on

civilians in a few months.

I mean that, in a state of exhaustion, we might come to believe that since less

that 10-percent of nearly two million displaced people have risked their lives to go

home to plant crops this year, they’re fine with the new status quo—and we should

be, too.

So I hope that during your testimony Mr. Secretary you will clearly and specifically

lay out what has to happen on the ground in Darfur for the administration

to consider the situation resolved, and what exactly our policy is to get there.

Because no matter how tired we get, the people of Darfur are even more tired.

They are tired, they are scared, and they are traumatized. And unlike all of us in

this room, they do not get to turn the channel, or turn to page two, or wake up

from the nightmare of their lives.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

And when I get to my turn to question, I will fold

in some of the observations I was about to make. And it is great

to see General Jones here.

General, welcome.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for jumping in with both feet into this.

I mean this sincerely. This is a travesty. I know you know it. You

have seen it. A number of us have been there. And it is monumental.

Let me make one reference to my opening statement. I think that

we have, to use an overused phrase up here on the Hill, a very narrow

window here. The American people are about to suffer from fatigue

here. The fact that there are two million displaced persons,

the fact that there has been some ramping down of the genocidal

activity, the fact that there is some progress being made, couple

that with the incredible burden that the American people are feeling,

as is everyone, including the President, of the loss of life in

Iraq, the hundreds of billions of dollars total being expended, now

another gosh-knows-how-much money for the Gulf States, and I am

a little worried that we have not sorted out what resources will be

needed.

You mention the need for congressional support and resources. I

think that is going to have to be pretty targeted pretty quick, pretty

soon, because, you know, we will hear not irrationally from our

constituents that charity begins at home. This is a situation where

progress has been made, but a lot more has to be done.

And so I would urge, to the extent that you can get a fix on what

you think is going to be needed. In addition, perhaps not to answer

now in the eight minutes I have, but in a written response, a pretty

detailed assessment; if you can tell us, who else is in the game,

what other countries are contributing, what European countries

are doing beyond the NATO mission, it would be very helpful.

After I got back from visiting a refugee camp in Chad—the

northernmost—about 15 kilometers from the border, I kept contact

with a number of the NGOs that we ran into; to be precise about

this, my staff has kept in contact. And they are acknowledging that

on the ground that there has been some progress. But they are concerned

that the lack of the physical capacity of the AU, the African

Union, in terms of literally the weapons they carry, the logistical

capability they have, is beginning to wear off a little bit in terms

of people thinking that they had better be careful, because the AU

may respond.

I have a number of questions for General Jones more specifically

about what we do relative to the AU, what NATO does. But here

is my concern. The mandate that the AU has and Khartoum’s, how

can I say it, acquiescence in that mandate seems to me to still be

relatively narrow. And this transition, looking at a transition from

African Union to U.N. control forces, I think is pretty dicey. But

let me, with that background, ask this question: You seem to—and

I am not disagreeing with you. I just want to make sure I understand

it. You seem to be putting a lot of your hope and expectations

on the North-South agreement succeeding in the sense that in

Khartoum there is southern representation that has some political

clout, that as a consequence of that, there will be a more rational

policy coming out of Khartoum towards Darfur.

Is that correct? Am I connecting the dots?

I met with some of those leaders. They came in.

They came across the border from Sudan. They were actually field

commanders. At least they identified themselves as that. And as

best as we could assess from our checking with your folks, they

were. But my sense, for what it is worth, is that they will be manageable

in direct proportion to their being convinced that Khartoum

is in fact not just waiting until the crisis occurs somewhere

else in the world and the focus gets taken off of this area, because

that is my greatest concern. And it will happen. This is a volatile

world we are in right now.

My time is almost up, so let me conclude by asking you about

Chad. One of the things that I observed, I mean, what a God-forsaken

part of the world in terms of natural resources or lack thereof,

with people who really did, because of tribal connections, open

up, at least the present leader of Chad, open up access to a couple

hundred thousand people coming across the border.

I apologize for not knowing this, but have we made any commitment,

or the international community made any commitment, to

make Chad whole economically for what has been an absorption of

resources, not the least of which is just clear cutting the few pieces

of wood that exists sticking out of that desert area?

What are we doing relative to the impact for them? If we had

3,000 folks coming from Haiti into Florida, or 300,000 or 200,000

or 100,000, we would have a significant impact. And I found it fascinating—

and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman—when I met

with Chadians, they want to know how they can get into the

camps. And I asked them, ‘‘What do you mean, get into the

camps?’’ They said, ‘‘Why can’t we go into the camps and get

water? Why can’t we go into the camps and get food? Why can’t we

live in the camps?’’ which I thought was a pretty interesting observation

of the status of their circumstances absent this influx.

So my question is: Tell me about Chad resources, impact of the

several hundred thousand folks, and are we or the international

community doing anything to ‘‘make them whole,’’ if you will, for

lack of a better phrase?

And I thank you for your testimony.

Thank you, General Jones. It is a pleasure to

have you here. I cannot think at this moment in transition—and

you have referenced how NATO, when you were here in the Senate

and we were beginning—this is a different NATO. It is a different

world. And at this critical moment in this transition period, when

some in this country have questioned the utility of NATO and the

total expenditures that we have in NATO, I cannot think of anybody

we could have had better positioned to be the Supreme Allied

Commander than you. You bring a breath of knowledge and also

a breath of candor and straightforwardness that those of us that

sit on this side of the table have truly valued. And I am not being

solicitous.

So I want to thank you. Thank you for your leadership. And that

is not a usual thankful, General. I mean that sincerely. It is a big

deal. And it is a big deal where you are right now for us, in my

view.

I want to pursue a little bit of what the Chairman was talking

about. There is, at least in my travels in Europe, a growing recognition

of the importance strategically of Africa to Europe. As you

said, the Mediterranean is not very wide anymore. And the concern

about a destabilized continent and what it can and might do to a

stable Europe is something I think is daunting on people.

But do you think there is the sense—and I realize you are a military

man. But I have, if I may say—when I first got here as a

young 29-year-old kid elected to the Senate, I thought everyone—

this is a slight exaggeration; it is a real exaggeration—but I

thought everyone that all the flag officers in the United States

military were Slim Pickens jumping out of the back of a B-52, sitting

on a hydrogen bomb. Remember that movie?

And in the last 25 years, the single-most competent people that

I have encountered in all of government have been flag officers. If

I had to list the top 25 people that have impressed me in my last

32 years, I would say 15 of them would be wearing a uniform; because

you not only understand the Constitution, you understand

foreign policy and you understand military person.

So I am not being solicitous when I ask you this question. What

is your sense from the perm reps that you have to deal with every

day, that is the civilian ambassadors, if you will, at NATO, as to

their sense of the emerging competition that China presents in Africa?

Is it palpable yet or is it only kind of at this strategic military

level that people are thinking about it?

One of the things that some of us—I do not speak

for the Chairman, but my recollection is he may have shared the

same view, that when some of us over a year ago or longer said

NATO should get in the game here in Darfur, we were basically

told by some that, as my Grampa would say, ‘‘that horse can’t carry

that sleigh,’’ that NATO is too overextended, NATO is preoccupied,

*et cetera.*

And it is interesting to me that the gold standard, quite frankly,

unfortunately for you all, is NATO. And when NATO stands up,

most folks, the bad guys, usually stand down. I am being a bit facetious,

but not really. My view was in our discussions about NATO’s

involvement was that I was convinced that if NATO stood up in

any form, that the Janjaweed would stand down, and Khartoum

would back down.

Now here is the question I have. And my time is running and

I see my colleague from Illinois is here. So I will try to consolidate

this question. It seems to me that your present activity, and you

listed it as it relates to Darfur, to go from the general to the specific,

we are getting airlift map exercises, capacity building, that we

have a shot here of doing something that can extend beyond the

benefits that may flow to Darfur immediately. And that is to begin

the process of maybe, maybe, moving the AU, the African Union,

military capacity to a different stage, a different place, that this

maybe this exercise that allows that to begin to happen.

And so my question is, as it relates to Darfur, given the constraints

of the mandate under which the AU is currently operating,

such as Khartoum’s ability to keep the African Union from deploying

to prevent attacks, if you were asked by the NAC—and you

may not want to answer this. But if I know you well enough, as

I think I do, hopefully you will—if you were asked by the NAC,

what further assistance would you recommend that NATO provide

the AU in order to enhance their ability to protect civilians in

Darfur beyond what you are doing, if—so it goes more to your capacity,

if you were given the mandate or instructions. Is there the

capacity in NATO to do more? I am not suggesting you are not

doing all you have been asked to do.